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
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BLANC MONT

(MEUSE–ARGONNE–CHAMPAGNE)

Monograph No. 9

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Prepared in the
Historical Branch, War Plans Division
General Staff

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WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, *April 12, 1920.*

The following monograph, entitled "Blanc Mont (Meuse-Argonne-Champagne)," prepared in the Historical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff, is approved and published for the information of all concerned.

[062.1, A. G. O.]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

PEYTON C. MARCH,
General, Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
P. C. HARRIS,
The Adjutant General.

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GENERAL SCHEME OF MONOGRAPHS, HISTORICAL BRANCH.

(Where a title is given without special mark, the monograph is contemplated or in preparation; a title with a single * indicates a monograph completed and awaiting publication; a title with two ** indicates a published monograph.)

I. Narrative History of Military Operations.

The Major Operations of the A. E. F. (G. O. 83, W. D., 1919.) H. B. Monograph No. 17.

*"Cambrai." H. B. Monograph No. 5, W. D. Doc. 1017, 1920.

"Somme Defensive and Lys."

*"Aisne and Montdidier-Noyon." H. B. Monograph No. 13.

"Champagne-Marne and Aisne-Marne." H. B. Monograph No. 14.

(*a*) "The 3d Division on the Marne." H. B. Monograph No. 15.

"Somme Offensive, Oise-Aisne, Ypres-Lys."

**(*a*) "Operations 2d Corps in Somme Offensive." H. B. Monograph No. 10, W. D. Doc. 1016, 1920.

"St. Mihiel." H. B. Monograph No. 12.

"Meuse-Argonne."

** "Blanc Mont (Meuse-Argonne-Champagne)." H. B. Monograph No. 9, W. D. Doc. 1010, 1920.

"Vittorio-Veneto."

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** "A Handbook of Economic Agencies of the War of 1917." H. B. Monograph No. 3, W. D. Doc. No. 908, 1919.

* "The Signal Corps and Air Service: A Study of their Expansion in the United States, 1917–1918." H. B. Monograph No. 16.

V. Histories of Troop Units.

* "Outlines of Histories of Divisions."

** "Outline History of Regiments."

BLANC MONT.

OPERATIONS OF THE 2D AND 36TH DIVISIONS WITH THE FOURTH FRENCH ARMY IN CHAMPAGNE IN OCTOBER, 1918.

[Map $\frac{1}{200,000}$ herewith; for greater detail see Tahure, Attigny and Ste. Marie sheets, $\frac{1}{80,000}$.]

The Blanc Mont operation is classed by the Americans as a part of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, but in a broader sense it was a part of the general offensive that extended along the entire front of the Allied Armies between Switzerland and the English Channel. All of the armies were engaged in a converging attack—the British toward Cambrai, the French east and west of Reims toward the Aisne, and the Americans toward Sedan and Mézières. The result of these operations, if successful, would be to clear the Germans from France and Belgium, prevent the withdrawal of a large part of them into Germany, and also prevent the removal of the supplies accumulated in Belgium. This would be effected by the cutting of the Carignan-Sedan-Mézières railway system, and the cutting or threatening of the northern system through Liège.

The reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was preliminary to the main operation, which commenced on September 26. In the main operation the First American Army advanced in and east of the Argonne forest. The Fourth French Army, in whose sector the Blanc Mont operation occurred, advanced west of the forest. Thus a successful advance by both armies would lessen German resistance in the difficult country covered by the woods.

When the Germans were thrown back in the first battle of the Marne in 1914, the line stabilized in Champagne about halfway between Souain (5 kilometers north of Suippes) and Somme-Py. It passed through Navarin Farm and it was in this vicinity that the 21st Corps of the Fourth French Army attacked when the Meuse-Argonne operation started on September 26.

The French, prior to their attack in this quarter, had called upon Gen. Pershing for assistance, and the orders transferring the two divisions that later on participated in it were issued by general headquarters on September 23.

Attacking September 26 on the Navarin Farm line, the 21st French Corps had succeeded in advancing about 5 kilometers, forcing the Germans to abandon their successive lines until, on September 30, the latter were holding the rearmost line of the main position. North of Somme-Py this line consisted of the Prussian, Elbe, and Essen trenches, and it was the resistance offered by these trenches that had stopped the French advance when the 2d American Division relieved them here on the night of October 1–2.

Op. Rpt., 2d Div. The 2d Division had participated in the St. Mihiel offensive, September 12–15, 1918. On the night of September 15–16 the division marched from its position in the front line of the Thiaucourt sector to the Ansauville-Royaumeix area, 12 kilometers north of Toul.

F. O. 30, 2d Div.

Op. Rpt., 2d Div. On September 20 and 21 the division marched to the vicinity of Toul, where it reorganized and received new clothing and equipment.

F. O. 31, 2d Div.

File No. 108.02, G. H. Q. On September 23 the chief of staff, First Army, sent a telegram to the 2d Division informing it that it would proceed to a new area, and on the same date issued Special Order 285, which prescribed the details of the move. The movement was made by rail (except motor transport by marching) starting on September 25 and terminating on September 28. A special order, Fourth French Army, directed detrainment near Châlons, where the division passed into the reserve of the Group of Armies of the Center (G. A. C.)

File No. 106.02, G. H. Q.

F. O. 32, 2d Div.

File No. 102, G. H. Q.

File No. 108.02, G. H. Q. On September 23 the 36th Division, which was undergoing training in the Bar-sur-Aube area and which had not yet been in line, was notified by wire from First Army headquarters that it would proceed to a new area. Special Order 286 prescribed the details of the movement, which was made by rail. The divisional artillery was not serving with the division at this time and did not join it until after the armistice. The strength of the 36th Division on September 26 was 656 officers and 15,590 enlisted. Besides a shortage of 20 per cent in strength, there was lacking a great deal of equipment, which was only partially supplied upon the arrival of the division in the battle area. The movement commenced on September 26 and terminated on September 28. The division then occupied billets south of the Marne River between Epernay and Châlons, where it formed a part of the reserve of the

File No. 106.02, G. H. Q.

Op. Rpt., 2d Div.

F. O. 1, 36th Div.

French Group of Armies of the Center. For purposes of supply it was attached to the Fifth French Army.

On September 28 the 2d Division was placed in the reserve of the Fourth French Army and on September 28–30 moved by marching and trucks to the Souain–Suippes area, 10 kilometers south of Somme-Py, where the Fourth Army was, with little success, attacking the German line. F. O. 33, 2d Div. Op. Rpt., 2d Div.

On October 1 orders from the Fourth French Army assigned the 2d Division to the 21st French Corps, and orders from the latter directed the division to relieve the 61st French Division in the front line. The relief was effected the night of October 1–2. The 4th Brigade (5th and 6th Marines) occupied the front line trenches just north of Somme-Py between the Boyau de Custrine (right) and Boyau de Bromberg (left), a front of over 3 kilometers. The 5th Marines relieved the 219th and 265th French Infantry; the 6th Marines, the 264th French Infantry and a battalion of the 21st French Division which was on the left of the 61st French Division. F. O. 34, 2d Div. Op. Rpt., 2d Div.

The formation of the brigade in line was as follows:

LEFT.	RIGHT.
2d Battalion 6th Marines and 81st Machine Gun Company.	1st Battalion 5th Marines and Regimental Machine Gun Company.
1st Battalion 6th Marines and Regimental Machine Gun Company.	2d Battalion 5th Marines and 23d Machine Gun Company.
3d Battalion 6th Marines and 15th Machine Gun Company.	3d Battalion 5th Marines and 77th Machine Gun Company.

The front line lay in the German trenches Pacha, Elbe, and Essen. On the right of the sector the 4th Brigade occupied the Essen trench, which had been a support trench when the German front line ran through Navarin Farm, 5 kilometers to the south. It was practically the rearmost trench of the German main line, the next trenches to the north being along the Blanc Mont ridge, 3 kilometers farther back. On the left of the sector west of the Boyau de la Pirna the Germans still occupied the Essen trench to include a bend in this trench half a kilometer to the west of the American boundary. This bend occupied an elevation from which flanking fire was delivered on the Americans in their initial advance, which greatly retarded the operations of the division. It was known to the Americans as "Essen Hook."

The 3d Brigade (9th and 23d Infantry) was placed in reserve south of the Navarin Farm ridge.

F. O. 34, 2d Div. The artillery of the 61st French Division remained in place. The 2d Field Artillery Brigade moved into the sector October 1. Both came under the 2d Division when the command passed at 8 a. m., October 2.

Op. Rpt., 2d Div.

Divisional headquarters were established at 8 a. m., October 2, in a dugout (Wagram) on the Souain–Somme-Py road 1 kilometer north of Souain.

The relief of the 61st French Division by the 2d Division was made on verbal orders, the written orders not arriving at 4th Brigade headquarters until 4.40 a. m.—after the relief was effected.

F. O. 35, 2d Div. The 2d Division, after taking its position in line, was the left (west) division of the 21st French Corps. The 67th French Division was on its right and the 21st French Division on its left.

Op. Rpt., 2d Div. A general attack had been contemplated for October 2d, but it was postponed until the 3d, and the day of the 2d and the night of the 2d–3d was devoted to clearing out those portions of Essen trench still occupied by the Germans. This was accomplished easily, as the Germans withdrew from the front of the 4th Brigade during the night, allowing the 5th Marines to occupy Essen trench north of Somme-Py without difficulty, while the 6th Marines lost 15 men by fire from Essen Hook.

Op. Rpt., 4th Brig.

F. O. 35, 2d Div. Field Orders No. 35, which prescribed the attack of the 2d Division on October 3, was issued at 11 p. m. October 2. The proposed plans had been discussed by the division and brigade commanders the afternoon of October 2. The written order did not reach 4th Brigade headquarters until 4.40 a. m. October 3, and the commanding officer of the leading battalion of the 6th Marines did not receive his copy until H hour and did not read it until he had attained his objective.

Op. Rpt., 4th Brig.

F. O. 35, 2d Div. The division was to attack with both brigades in line, 3d Brigade and 3d Battalion French tanks on right, 4th Brigade and 2d Battalion French tanks on left; each brigade in column of regiments, the leading regiment in three lines of one battalion each, and the rear regiment in reserve. The division objective was the road from Médéah Farm to Blanc Mont (Hill 211, 3 km. S. W.) with an outpost line a kilometer in advance of the road.[1]

[1] At 6.20 p. m., October 2, G–3, 2d Division, received the following message from Lieut. White, information officer with the 21st French Division: "The 21st Division attacks the enemy on its front to-morrow at 5.30 a. m., supported by tanks. Its immediate objectives are at Elbe trench and the Essen trench. It was stopped by the Essen trench, which it has been attacking to-day * * *." In other words, the objective of the 21st French Division was 2 kilometers in rear of the objective of the 2d Division.

The 2d Field Artillery Brigade assisted by the artillery of the 61st French Division was to support the attack by a preparation of 5 minutes, a creeping barrage to 300 meters beyond the objective, a standing barrage of 30 minutes on this line after the arrival of the left brigade on the objective, or until H plus 2 hours and 38 minutes, and a creeping barrage to a line 1,300 meters beyond the objective. Here the barrage was to rest until the Infantry outpost line was established. The 252d French Aviation Squadron was attached to the division.

H hour, originally set for 6.30 a. m., was advanced 40 minutes and the troops moved out at 5.50 a. m. The artillery preparation was made 15 minutes longer than originally ordered, or 20 minutes in all, commencing at 5.30 a. m. Memo. Hdqs. 2d Div., Oct. 2

The 4th Brigade's parallel of departure was the Essen trench, which it was already occupying, the 5th Marines on the right and the 6th Marines on the left. At H hour the 6th Marines were to advance while the 5th Marines, waiting until the 6th should clear, were to move by the left flank and follow in their rear as reserve. Op. Rpt., 4th Brig.

The "jump off" was a much more difficult matter for the 3d Brigade, which was some 7 kilometers in rear of its designated parallel of departure, to which place it had to proceed by a night march. This parallel, which was designated as "Present front on the general line: 03–1.0–Altona" (across main road, 2 km. N. of Somme-Py), lay in territory still in the enemy's hands, though that fact was unknown when the order was issued. A staff officer of the 170th French Division had promised to furnish guides who were to meet the brigade near Butte-de-Souain (in the Bois du Moineau and Clairière des Aimées), but these guides failed to appear. The result of this was that the 3d Brigade spent most of the night of October 2–3 in getting to the position from which the attack was delivered; and when it finally got there, it was not the position ordered by Field Orders No. 35. but one-half a kilometer in rear of it, north of the Essen trench and east of the Somme-Py—Médéah Farm road. Most of the brigade arrived only a few minutes before H hour. At 3.07 a. m. October 3 the chief of staff received the following message from Gen. Ely, commanding the 3d Brigade: Op. Rpt., 2d Div. Op. Rpt., 3d Brig. "The designated position being in the enemy's hands." Statement of Brig. Gen. Hanson E. Ely. Hist. Br. Files.

Units in place as follows: Two battalions 9th in communication with other battalion of 9th. Not in communication with 23d. Guides did not report at points given by staff officer of 170th French Division. Message, Ely to C. of S.

History, 23d Inf.

The 23d Infantry, after failing to find the guides near the Butte de Souain, had struck out across country in an effort to reach its position. Shortly before H hour officers from the reconnaissance party located the regiment, and at H hour the regimental commander, Col. Stuart, reported his regiment in position ready to advance.

Op. Rpts., 2d Div., 3d and 4th Brigs.

F. O. 37, 3d Brig.

According to Field Orders No. 35, the right of the 4th Brigade was to start from a point in the Essen trench (82.81) just east of the Somme-Py–St. Etienne road, while the left of the 3d Brigade was to start from "Altona," 2 kilometers to the northeast. The 3d Brigade really started from a line one-half kilometer in rear of the one indicated, but nevertheless a gap of over a kilometer existed between the two brigades who were to converge on the objective. This might have proved a dangerous operation had the Germans not withdrawn quite generally from the front of the 2d Division before the attack started. As it turned out the two brigades joined on the objective and the Germans who remained in the pocket were captured.

"The nature of the ground made this advantageous; i. e., taking the ridge at an oblique and concentrating on the objective." Statement of Brig. Gen. Hanson E. Ely. Hist. Br. Files.

History, 23d Inf.

Op. Rpt., 3d Brig.

Message, Ely to G–3.

The 3d Brigade advanced with the 9th Infantry leading and the 23d Infantry in reserve. The 67th French Division attacked on its right. The first objective, the road from Médéah Farm to the crossroads 2 kilometers to the southwest (73.11) was taken at 8.30 a. m. and outposts were established on the northern slope of Blanc Mont–Médéah Farm ridge.

Message, information officer with 67th Div.

Op. Rpt., 3d Brig.

The 67th French Division on the right connected with the 3d Brigade slightly in advance of Médéah Farm, its line including Bois du Chien. Connection was also made with the Marines on the left.

Casualties were few.

At 10.15 a. m. a battalion of the 23d Infantry was placed at the disposal of Maj. Barker, of the 5th Marines, to resist a counterattack. This attack did not develop and the battalion rejoined its regiment.

Message, Ely to Div. Comdr.

Op. Rpt., 3d Brig.

At 10.30 a. m. Gen. Ely reported by phone to G–3:

Third Brigade objective reached at 8.30 a. m. and consolidated by 9th Infantry. A battalion of 23d Infantry sent forward about 1 kilometer as outpost.

When the 2d Division entered the line on the night of October 1–2, the 4th Brigade occupied the entire front of the division sector. Field Order No. 35, 2d Division, directed the attack of October 3 to be made in column of regiments in each brigade, the 4th Brigade parallel of

departure to extend from the crossroads (82.81), 1 kilometer northwest of Somme-Py, to the Boyau de Bromberg. This was a front of a little more than a kilometer and lay in the sector of the 6th Marines, which led the advance, followed by the 5th Marines in reserve. Each regiment was in three lines, a battalion in each line and a machine-gun company attached to each battalion. To the leading (2d) battalion of the 6th Marines was attached a French company of 12 light tanks and one was also attached to the following battalion (1st). Op. Rpt., 4th Brig.

The troops advanced at 5.30 a. m. and at 8.30 were on their objective, but Blanc Mont itself was still controlled by the Germans, who occupied the woods on the western slope and had not been dislodged. This territory lay within the sector of the French who were still south of the Elbe and Essen trenches. The French tanks moved forward with the leading battalions. The advance was opposed by machine-gun nests in front and in the triangular area between the brigades, which space had not been covered in the attack. It was later cleaned up by the 4th Marines, assisted by two companies of the 3d Brigade. Before reaching the objective the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, came up on the right of the leading (2d) battalion, and both advanced together to the objective. Message, 4th Brig. to G–3. Message, 4th Brig. to G–3. Message, Lejeune to Ely. Message, Ely to G–3. Op. Rpt., 4th Brig.

The greatest obstacle to the advance of the 4th Brigade was the German possession of Essen Hook. This was a system of trenches and dugouts forming a part of the Elbe and Essen line—the rearmost line of the main German position. The Hook formed a bend to the north in the line and was located on a hill 20 meters above the country across which the 4th Brigade was ordered to advance and one-half kilometer to the west of its sector. It flanked this country perfectly and the left of each battalion suffered from the machine guns located on the Hook. The French had unsuccessfully attacked this portion of the line on October 2, in an effort to expel the Germans from Essen trench. On October 3 the 21st French Division renewed the operation, and at 7.45 a. m. was attacking Essen trench. At about 8.30 a. m. the French were still fighting in the Saale and Minden trenches just south and west of Essen Hook, and a platoon of the 5th Marines and some French tanks were reported to be assisting them from the 2d Division sector. Op. Rpt., 4th Brig. Op. Rpt., 4th Brig. Message, Lt. White, information officer with 21st Div., to G–3. Message, White to G–3. Message, 4th Brig. to C. of S.

The platoon of the 5th Marines mentioned above was in reality the 17th Company, 5th Marines, reinforced by Rpt. Maj. L. P. Hunt, U. S. M. C. on capture of Essen

Hook. Also rpt. Lt. C. J. Norstrand, U. S. M. C., on same affair.

a section from the 8th Machine Gun Company and a 37-millimeter gun. This detachment belonged to the 1st (rear) Battalion of the 5th Marines, and early on October 3 was ordered to clean out the Hook after the other five battalions of the brigade had advanced beyond the trenches. The Hook was captured and turned over to the French, along with about 100 prisoners, before 11 a. m. and the detachment rejoined its battalion.

Lt. White to G–3.

Maj. Roberts, information officer, with 4th Brig., to G–3.

Lt. Col. A. D. Bruce, Inf., on capture of the Hook.

The French did not retain possession of the Hook, and the Germans reoccupied it the afternoon of October 3.

Message, C. of S., 2d Div., to Col. Lay.

At 5.10 p. m. the chief of staff, 2d Division, informed Col. Lay, information officer with 21st French Corps, that the 2d Division was under artillery fire from the west and that the 21st French Division had not advanced beyond Essen trench, and requested that orders be given it to do so. At 7.45 p. m. Lieut. White reports the 21st Division line to be running north from (and including) Essen Hook to some patches of woods one-half kilometer northwest of the Hook, and to be in communication with the Americans 1 kilometer north of the Hook. As a matter of fact the French line did not include Essen Hook, but ran northwest from the Hook which was still occupied by the Germans the night of October 3–4. This retarded the operations of the 4th Brigade on October 3, and enabled the Germans to cling to the western slopes of Blanc Mont, from which the 4th Brigade had to dislodge them on October 4; from here they fell back to the St. Etienne line, where they made a second stand until October 11.

Message, Col. Lay to C. of S., 11.40 a. m.

The second attack on the afternoon of October 3 was made pursuant to instructions from Gen. Naulin, commanding the 21st Corps, which directed the 2d Division to advance, leaving one battalion to support the left. Gen. Naulin then knew that the 2d Division had gained its first objective. A message to the 2d Division from the information officer with the 21st French Division at 11.20 a. m. stated that the latter division had taken the German trenches in its front and was advancing northward.

Message, Lt. White to G–3.

F. O. 36, 2d Div.

The attack was ordered by Field Order 36, 2d Division, issued at 4 p. m., which prescribed merely that the two brigades should move forward from their present positions to a line extending from the road fork about 1 kilometer southwest of Scay Farm to a point on Blanc Mont–St. Etienne road about 1 kilometer south of St. Etienne, there to establish and hold a line of resistance. The 2d Field Artillery Brigade was to support the move-

ment, but a battalion of the 35th French Artillery that supported the first attack was withdrawn from the control of the 2d Division during the second attack in order to assist the French attack against Essen trench.

Message, Lejeune to Gen. Naulin, through Col. Lay.

H hour was given as 4 p. m., but the 23d Infantry, which made the attack in the 3d Brigade sector, did not pass through the 9th Infantry until 5 p. m. and the attack proper was made by the 1st Battalion at 6 p. m. Some distance was gained and the leading battalion reached the high ground of St. Etienne, where it occupied a salient with both flanks exposed. This position was in the 4th Brigade sector, as the dividing line between brigades ran just to the east of Hill 159 (160 on $\frac{1}{20.000}$ map), which was the high ground occupied.

Op. Rpt., 3d Brig.

History, 23d Inf.

Op. Rpt., 3d Brig.

"Was taken by order of the 3d Brigade commanding officer as Marine Brigade was held up and the position dominated the Suippe Valley." Statement of Brig. Gen. Hanson E. Ely. Hist. Br. Files.

In the 4th Brigade the advance prescribed by Field Order 36 was made by the 5th Marines, which passed through the 6th, and was able to advance only about 1½ kilometers, where it hung on under fire. Two companies of the 6th Marines were ordered up to protect the left flank.

Op. Rpt., 4th Brig.

At midnight the line of the 2d Division was approximately as follows:

The 9th Infantry on the road from Médéah Farm to the crossroads 2 kilometers to the southwest. The 23d Infantry between this road and the hill 1 kilometer southeast of St. Etienne. The leading battalion on this hill was over 2 kilometers in advance of the 9th Infantry and not in communication with either the French 67th Division on the right or the 4th Brigade on the left. The 5th Marines a little north of the Blanc Mont ridge road northeast of Blanc Mont. The 6th Marines south of the Blanc Mont ridge road. The left of the 4th Brigade line was refused because of the Germans still on the western slopes of Blanc Mont.

The area occupied by the Infantry was a triangle, its base a line from Médéah Farm to the southeastern slope of Blanc Mont, and its apex the hill 1 kilometer southeast of St. Etienne. The difficulty of this position is evident, as on the right the French had not advanced as far as Médéah Farm and on the left they were still south of Blanc Mont.

"As per order of Brigade Commander, 3d Brigade, to make a hole and later broaden." Statement of Brig. Gen. Hanson E. Ely. Hist. Br. Files.

On October 3 the 36th Division was transferred from the reserve of the Group of Armies of the Center to the reserve of the Fourth French Army effective on October 4.

Telegram 7354-B, G. A. C.

F. O. 2, 36th Div. On the night October 4–5 the 71st Infantry Brigade and the 111th Field Signal Battalion were transferred by truck from the region Tours-sur-Marne to the Suippes-Somme-Suippe area.

F. O. 37, 2d Div. Field Order 37, 2d Division, issued at 6 a. m. October 4, directed a resumption of the advance to the north.

Memo., Rhea to Ely, 10.55 a. m. The designation of H hour was postponed until aeroplanes should report as to the position of the divisions on the flanks—whether or not these divisions were abreast of the 2d Division.

History, 23d Inf. At daybreak October 4, the Germans counterattacked the 23d Infantry in its advanced position and were repulsed. This regiment also suffered considerably from fire in the rear, from machine guns that had been passed by during its advance of the previous evening or that had slipped through the line. At 2 p. m. the 1st Battalion was holding the front in some old German trenches southeast of St. Etienne while the 3d Battalion and a part of the 2d were protecting the flanks. Connection with the 67th French Division on the right had

Message, 4th Brig. to G–3. not been established, but the 5th Marines advancing along the Somme-Py–St. Etienne road north of Blanc Mont during the morning had relieved the situation on that flank.

During the night October 3–4 the 22d French Division relieved the 21st French Division south of Blanc Mont. The 22d Division advanced the morning of October 4

Message, Aero. Squad. 27 to C. G., 2d Div. along the Boyaux Beyreuth and Nuremberg; it did not take as its objective the western slopes of Blanc Mont, which were still occupied by the Germans, but bore away toward the northwest. At about 10 a. m. a bat-

Message, 22d Div. to G–3. talion of the 22d Division was arriving at the St. Pierre–St. Etienne road, and other French troops were approaching the Arnes River to the northwest of St. Pierre. Thus the advance of this division did not immediately relieve the situation on the left flank of the 4th Brigade, although it undoubtedly made the Germans on Blanc Mont apprehensive, as they were now occupying a salient position, and this made the final operations against the hill much easier for the 4th Brigade.

Message, Aero. Squad. 27, to G–3. The 67th French Division on the right of the 3d Brigade also advanced the morning of October 4, but

Message, Ely to G–3. was stopped before noon on the line Orfeuil–Bémont Château. This division seems to have been in communi-

cation with the 9th Infantry, near Médéah Farm, but not with the 23d Infantry in its advanced position.

"Communication with 9th Infantry, which had been placed between it and the French." Statement of Brig. Gen. Hanson E. Ely, Hist. Br. Files.

At about 12.30 p. m. the division commander, 2d Division, designated H hour as 2.30 p. m. The 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, which was occupying a salient position southeast of St. Etienne, advanced toward the ridge northeast of the village. This attack was not supported on either flank, as the 4th Brigade did not advance at all, and the French 67th Division, fighting south of Bémont Château, was too far away to render assistance. The attacking waves came immediately under heavy machine-gun fire as well as a counter barrage. Casualties were numerous, the battalion commander was killed, and after an advance of only 300 yards, the battalion withdrew to its former position in the German trenches southeast of St. Etienne.

Message, G–3 to Neville.

Op. Rpt., 3d Brig.

History, 23d Inf.

Op. Rpt., 4th Brig.

History, 23d Inf.

The attack ordered by Field Order 37, 2d Division, for October 4 was not carried out by the 4th Brigade because "it was considered inadvisable to advance leaving the machine-gun nests on the western slopes of Blanc Mont intact." Some operations were undertaken against these nests without much success. The 4th Brigade commander reports that they were reconnoitered the afternoon of October 4 and unsuccessfully attacked during the evening. The reconnaissance evidently involved some hard fighting. At 2.20 p. m. the regimental commander, 5th Marines, reports "Marines badly shot up" and requests artillery fire north of Blanc Mont. At 2.40 p. m. the adjutant, 4th Brigade, reports Marines held up by fire from east end of Blanc Mont, and at 3.05 p. m. the division information officer with the 4th Brigade reports that machine-gun nests on west end of Blanc Mont are causing heavy casualties in 4th Brigade.

Op. Rpt., 4th Brig.

Op. Rpt., 4th Brig.

Message, Feland to Lejeune.

Message, Adjt. 4th Brig. to G–3.

Message, Maj. Roberts to G–3.

At 3 p. m. the chief of staff, 2d Division, informed G–3, 21st French Corps, that the 2d Division was unable to advance because the divisions on its flanks had failed to keep abreast, and that the 22d French Division on the left had advanced west instead of north. He also told him that the 2d Division could not maintain its position north of Blanc Mont and Médéah Farm, unless its flanks were covered.

Message, Myers to G–3, 21st Corps.

Late in the afternoon, however, the situation on the western slopes of Blanc Mont eased up somewhat. At 4 p. m. the resistance there had ceased and the 6th Marines

Message, 4th Brig. to G–3.

Message, 4th Brig. to G–3.

were advancing, having cleaned up the machine guns. In this the 17th French Infantry assisted.

Message, Col. Ellis to G–3.

At 9.05 p. m. the regimental commander, 6th Marines, reports a gap of 400 to 500 yards between his regiment and the 22d French Division, and the information officer with the 22d Division reports that at 5.40 p. m. the division is in communication with the Marines at a point 400 meters north of Blanc Mont.

Message, Lt. Swett to G–3.

At midnight October 4, the situation in the 3d Brigade was practically the same as on October 3. In the 4th Brigade, the 5th Marines were still on the Blanc Mont-Médéah Farm ridge, their right near the cross roads on the Somme-Py–St. Etienne road and their left refused so as to face the eastern slopes of Blanc Mont. The 6th Marines had passed Blanc Mont and were in communication with the 22d French Division, which was near St. Pierre. The Germans still held the crest and eastern slopes of Blanc Mont, but they were practically surrounded there. They held St. Etienne, whence they had driven back patrols of the 23d Infantry. In the front of the 2d Division the Germans were holding a line from St. Etienne through the cemetery to the east.

Message, C. O. 23d Inf. to G–3.

Message, 21st Corps to G–3.

At 11 p. m. the 3d Battalion, 341st French Field Artillery, was placed at the disposal of the 2d Division.

F. O. 38, 2d Div.

Field Order No. 38, 2d Division, issued at 4 a. m. October 5, directed the division to continue its advance toward the same objective given in Field Order No. 37—Machault–Cauroy. H hour was not given, and at 9.05 a. m. the division commander, in a telephone conversation with the commander of the 3d Brigade, said "H hour will not be given." In the same conversation he describes the cleaning up of Blanc Mont, and says that all the 2d Division will do on October 5 will be to keep abreast of the French divisions on the flanks—that no formal attacks will take place. Thus, Field Order No. 38 was practically revoked as far as the 3d Brigade was concerned. The 23d Infantry made no attempt to advance. At 3.40 p. m. the line of the 3d Brigade extended from 1 kilometer southeast of St. Etienne to southeast of Médéah Farm, practically the same as on October 4. The 23d Infantry was still occupying the right of the 4th Brigade's sector at 4.05 p. m.

Telephone message, Lejeune to Ely.

History, 23d Inf.

Message, Ely to 2d F. A. Brig.

Telephone message, C. of S. to C. O. 6th Marines.

Message, C. O. 6th Marines to G–3.

At 6.15 a. m. October 5 the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, attacked the German machine guns on Blanc Mont and,

with no casualties, carried the hill and captured 209 prisoners, besides much matériel, including 75 machine guns and trench mortars. The bloodless character of this enterprise was due to the efficient artillery preparation by the 2d Field Artillery Brigade. This operation was preliminary to the advance prescribed by Field Order No. 38, the provisions of which could not have been carried out as long as the Germans occupied Blanc Mont.

Message, 4th Brig. to G–3.

Message, 4th Brig. to G–3.

Memo., 2d F. A. Brig. to C. of S.

The operation report of the 4th Brigade states that pursuant to Field Order No. 38 the 4th Brigade attacked in the direction Machault–Cauroy on the afternoon of October 5. The 6th Marines passed through the 5th Marines, the 2d Battalion leading, and the attack was stopped by machine-gun fire 2 kilometers southeast of St. Etienne, where the troops dug in. The records do not show that H hour was designated to the 4th Brigade, and it is probable that this movement was in line with Gen. Lejeune's intention not to make any formal attacks on October 5, but merely to keep his line abreast of the French divisions on the flanks. This advance relieved the situation on the left of the 23d Infantry, which had been occupying an advanced position, partly in the 4th Brigade's sector, since October 3.

Op. Rpt., 4th Brig.

On the right of the 2d Division the French 73d Division attacked at 5.15 a. m. October 5, and at 6.10 a. m. had reached Wallmüller Lager, about 1 kilometer northeast of Médéah Farm. Here it was stopped, and then fell back to its line of departure. The 170th French Division was then put in at 11 a. m., evidently without success, as at 8.25 p. m. the information officer with the French reports to G–3 that the French hope for success and will do their best. Gen. Naulin, commanding the 21st Corps, was evidently apprehensive about the situation on the right of the 2d Division. In a message to Gen. Lejeune at 12.40 p. m. he tells him that a French division had been ordered to send assistance to the 73d Division and he requests the 2d Division not to hesitate to engage its reserves on that flank. The right flank of the 3d Brigade was still resting on Médéah Farm the evening of October 5.

Message, Infor. Off. with 73d Div. to G–3.

Tel. message, Infor. Off. to G–3.

Tel. message, Infor. Off. to G–3.

Message, Infor. Off. to G–3.

Message, G–3 to Infor. Off. 73d F. Div.

On the left of the 2d Division the French situation was more favorable. The 22d Division advanced with little opposition at 6 a. m., and at 10.55 a. m. had reached St. Pierre-à-Arnes, its right extending about 1 kilometer

Message Infor. Off. with 22d Div. to G–3.

Message, Col. Lay to G–3.
Message, Col. Lay to G–3.
Message, G–3 to Col. Lay.
Message, Infor. Off. with 22d Div. to G–3.

toward St. Etienne. This it was able to do because Blanc Mont had been cleared of the German machine guns. At 3.40 p. m. St. Etienne was erroneously reported captured. While patrols may have entered the western part of the village on October 5, there was fighting back and forth in the town and cemetery on October 5, 6, and 7, and the place was not definitely taken until October 8. However, the advance of the 22d Division brought the French line abreast of the 2d Division so that at 1.45 p. m. the two divisions were in communication about one-half kilometer south of St. Etienne.

Message, C. of S. to 4th M. G. Bn.
Op. Rpt., 4th M. G. Bn.

At 3 p. m. the 4th Machine Gun Battalion, until then in reserve, received orders to report to the 3d Brigade. Company B was sent to the 23d Infantry and Company A was held at brigade headquarters.

The line of the 3d Brigade was unchanged the night of October 5–6. The 4th Brigade had advanced its line so that it connected with the 23d Infantry on the ridge southeast of St. Etienne, whence it extended west and connected with the French about one-half kilometer south of that village.

The French 22d Division had experienced so little opposition in its advance that it believed the same conditions existed on the 2d Division's front. The 118th French Infantry, finding nothing in front of it to the west of St. Etienne, sent a message at 4.55 p. m. to the 2d Division recommending that the latter advance also, as probably little resistance would be met. The events of October 6 and 7 were to prove that the German main effort was directed against the 2d Division front, as this division was the most dangerous to the German plan of withdrawal.

Message, 22d Div. to G–3.

S. O. 4th French Army, Oct. 5.
Op. Order 21st Corps., Oct. 5.
F. O. 3 and 4, 36th Div.

The 71st Infantry Brigade and the 111th Field Signal Battalion, of the 36th American Division, were placed at the disposal of the 21st French Corps at 8 a. m. October 5. On October 6, they were placed at the disposal of the 2d Division. The remainder of the 36th Division (less artillery) was on October 6 and 7 moved by marching to the Suippes area.

History, 36th Div., pp. 57–60.

The 36th Division during its operations in Champagne was short a large amount of transportation. This shortage was supplied in part by the French and in part by the 2d Division, but at all times its movements were hampered.

On October 6 the only fighting consisted of small local actions in which the line was slightly advanced. These local actions included an attack at 6.30 a. m. by the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, on machine-gun nests southeast of St. Etienne, which were captured at 9.30 a. m., thus cleaning up the country south of the St. Etienne–Orfeuil road. The 23d Infantry also participated in this attack, which the 3d Brigade commander states was necessary because during the attacks on October 3–5 a part of the 23d Infantry had gotten into the Marine sector, and when moved out of it the night of October 5–6 in compliance with division orders, the vacated space was not occupied promptly by the Marines; the Germans therefore came back and delivered flanking fire from the west on the 3d Brigade. The result of this attack was to bring the front of the 2d Division up to the general line of the St. Etienne–Orfeuil road, which is where the 71st Brigade relieved it the night of October 6–7. The line was not continuous, nor were the troops sheltered, except in shell holes or fox holes made by the men themselves. Neither did it follow the road exactly, but departed from it at places by several hundred meters. On the right the line connected with the 73d French Division northwest of Médéah Farm, and on the left with the 7th French Division about one-half kilometer south of St. Etienne. The Germans still occupied the cemetery and the eastern part of St. Etienne, and the French line was bent around it to the west and north.

Op. Rpt., 2d Div.

Op. Rpt., 4th Brig.

Message, 4th Brig. to G–3.

Op. Rpt., 3d Brig.

Ely to C. O. 23d Inf.

History, 36th Div.

Message, 6th Marines to G–3.

The relief of the front line of the 2d Division by the 71st Brigade was effected the night of October 6–7, pursuant to Field Order No. 39, 2d Division, which directed the 3d and 4th Brigades to leave one battalion in each brigade sector until further orders. The brigade machine-gun battalions, the Stokes mortar, and the 37-millimeter detachments were to remain for 24 hours with the incoming brigade. Mortars and 37-millimeter guns were to be turned over to the 71st Brigade when the 2d Division personnel withdrew.

F. O. 39, 2d Div.

The 71st Brigade, which had had a difficult march on October 6 from Somme–Suippes to south of Somme-Py, started for the front line at 5.30 p. m. Guides from the 2d Division were to have met it in Somme-Py, but some did not appear and those that did were not well acquainted with the country. The result was that the

History, 36th Div.

Op. Rpt., 36th Div. entire night was spent by the troops in marching and countermarching through the rough country between Somme-Py and the front line. By daylight, however, all troops were in position except the Headquarters Company of the 142d Infantry, which wandered around until afternoon.

Op. Rpt., 3d Brig. The 141st Infantry relieved the 23d Infantry, which withdrew to the Pylone Hill. The 9th Infantry was left in line, each of its battalions being put alongside a corresponding battalion of the 141st Infantry, which had its

History, 36th Div. 1st Battalion in front, 2d Battalion in support, and 3d in reserve. The 142d Infantry relieved the 6th Marines, putting its 2d Battalion in front, its 1st in support, and its 3d in reserve. The 6th Marines withdrew to Blanc Mont ridge and the 5th Marines remained in support.

History, 36th Div. Companies B and C, 132d Machine Gun Battalion, were attached to the 141st Infantry, and Companies A and D to the 142d Infantry.

Message, Ely to Whitworth. The commanding general, 3d Brigade, retained command of his brigade sector. At 12.10 p. m. October 7 he informed the commanding general, 71st Brigade, of that fact and directed that the sector, which included the 141st Infantry, be extended 500 yards to the right so as to take over ground held by the French. This anomalous state of affairs might have had serious consequences, but it does not seem to have done so.

No fighting occurred in the American front on October 7. The time was utilized in reorganizing the line with the 71st Brigade in the front line, and making arrangements for the next attack, which all knew to be impending.

Message, Lt. Sweet to G–3. During the day conflicting reports were received as to the possession of St. Etienne by the French. The in-

Message, Infor. Off. with 4th Brig. to G–3. formation officer with the 22d French Division reports that the Germans took the town in a fog at 6.20 a. m., but that the French recaptured it at 8.30. The town is reported to be occupied by Germans before 8.40 a. m.

Message, 4th Brig. to G–3. These two reports agree, but at 11.50 a. m. a patrol of the 6th Marines was fired on from cemetery and western

Message, 6th Marines to G–3. [eastern?] edge of the town, and at 1.15 p. m. the 6th Marines reported that they estimated 200 Germans in St. Etienne and more coming over the hill. They believed that the Germans were trying to filter into the town and

Message, Infor. Off. with 21st Corps to C. of S. 2d Div. drive the remaining French out. The 21st Corps believed that the French held the town, as it sent two messages

to the 2d Division requesting the latter to take it over. The facts are that the Germans held the cemetery and the greater part of St. Etienne, while the French had a precarious footing in the western part of it.

During the afternoon reports were received that the Germans were digging in 1½ kilometers northeast of St. Etienne, and that they were massing in the woods northeast of the town. Also that their heavy artillery had been ordered back and that the infantry was to make a two days' stand. There was every indication that the Germans intended to hold on a line running from St. Etienne through the cemetery and thence to the northeast along the ridge toward Semide. Intel. Rpt., G–2 to G–3. Infor. Off. with 22d Div. to G–3. Intel. Rpt., G–2 to G–3.

The 7th French Division relieved the 22d on the left of the 2d Division the night of October 7–8.

The attack of October 8 was made pursuant to Field Order No. 40, 2d Division,[2] which prescribed an advance in the direction Machault–Cauroy. The infantry attack was to be made by the 71st Brigade on the front it was occupying. The 2d Division was to constitute the reserve and furnish the troops for flank protection and connection with the adjacent divisions. Two battalions of French tanks were assigned to the 71st Brigade. The 36th Division had no artillery, and the 2d Field Artillery Brigade with attached French artillery (29th, 341st, 452d F. A.) was to support the attack. The written order was issued at 11 p. m. October 7, but on the afternoon of the 7th the commanding general of the 71st Brigade was summoned to the 2d Division headquarters, where he received verbal orders for the attack. F. O. 40, 2d Div. History, 36th Div.

The field order issued by the 71st Brigade for the attack on October 8 was practically a copy of Field Order No. 40, 2d Division,[3] except that the tasks of the two infantry regiments were prescribed. These were to attack in column of battalions, which were to "leapfrog" as each successive objective was gained, the leading battalion becoming the rear battalion after the first objective was gained, the second battalion becoming the leading one, and the rear one becoming the second, etc. F. O. 1, 71st Brig.

[2] In the records of the 36th Division this order appears as F. O. 39. The 2d Division issued two field orders numbered 39, and subsequently renumbered the second one "40," but this change was not made in the copies sent to the 36th Division.

[3] F. O. 40, 2d Division, is made a part of F. O. 1, 71st Brigade, by notations such as the following: "As per F. O. 40, Headquarters 2d Division attached." This necessitated distributing the divisional field order to all who received the brigade order, which is not only likely to be confusing but dangerous if the former should be lost or not received.

Memo., 2d Div., to accompany F. O. 40.
History, 36th Div.

H hour was designated as 5.15 a. m.

The commanding general, 71st Brigade, assembled his regimental commanders during the evening of October 7, discussed the plans for the attack, and issued a warning order. He dismissed them about 9 p. m. and they returned to their headquarters and assembled the battalion commanders, who after receiving their orders returned to battalion headquarters and assembled the company commanders. All orders were based upon the verbal instructions given to Gen. Whitworth at 2d Division headquarters, as Field Order No. 40 (with a memorandum giving H hour attached) did not reach the 71st Brigade until after midnight and Field Order No. 1, 71st Brigade (with Field Order No. 40 attached), was not sent out until 3 a. m. and apparently got no farther than regimental headquarters. The result of all this was that the company commanders received verbal orders that had been four times verbally transmitted, those of the 141st Infantry (except Company A) receiving them between 1 and 3 a. m., while the 142d Infantry did not receive theirs until about 5 a. m. H hour seems to have reached the troops just before the attack was to start. The leading battalion of the 141st Infantry received it at about 5.11 a. m. The battalion commander of the leading battalion of the 142d Infantry was still giving his instruction to his company commanders when the barrage started.

History, 36th Div.

The 141st Infantry attacked in the sector formerly occupied by the 3d Brigade (right of the division sector). The leading battalion (1st) started on time, and immediately encountered heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. The battalion commander was killed. However, the troops advanced a short distance north of the St. Etienne–Orfeuil road, where they were definitely stopped.

The 2d and 3d Battalions, 141st Infantry, followed the 1st in the order named. Neither was ready to move at H hour—the 2d because the battalion commander decided to shift his companies in line at the last moment, and the 3d because of the failure of the companies to receive notification of H hour. Both battalions soon became disorganized. However, groups of them kept on and joined the 1st Battalion, north of the St. Etienne–Orfeuil road. Here the regiment hung on the rest of the day. Company A, 141st Infantry, had been on the extreme right of the battalion sector prior to the attack and runners with

orders had failed to reach it. Nevertheless, it advanced shortly after H hour also to a position north of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road, where it seems to have formed some kind of flank protection for the advanced elements of the regiment

The 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, which had been designated to connect the 71st Brigade and the 73d French Division, had become considerably involved. At 8.40 a. m. its commanding officer reported that the 141st Infantry had been stopped, that his losses were heavy, and that he must have assistance, and at 9 a. m. he asked for relief. The French 73d Division is reported to have advanced and then retired through the line of the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry. This report is not substantiated, but it is true that they did not advance sufficiently to better conditions on the right of the 71st Brigade. At 11.14 a. m. the information officer with the 73d Division reported that the French line extended west from Bois du Coq, which would be a prolongation of the line to which the fragments of the 141st Infantry were clinging.

Message, C. O. 2d Bn., 9th Inf., to C. O. 9th Inf.

Message, 71st Brig. to G–3.

Message, Ely to Lejeune.

Infor. Off. with 73d Div. to G–3.

At 2.40 p. m. the commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 2d Engineers, reported to his regimental commander that the battalion had relieved a battalion of the 9th Infantry and stated that the American line was ahead of the French line. A company of the 4th Machine Gun Battalion was also placed at the disposal of the Engineer Battalion, which took over the duties of flank protection and connection between the 71st Brigade and 73d French Division.

Message, 2d Bn. Engs. to C. O. 2d Engrs.

A battalion of French tanks was assigned to the 141st Infantry. The following report as to their operations is an extract from the History of the 36th Division:

History, 36th Div.

> It was about this time (6.30 a. m.) that the tanks attached to the regiment came into action. * * * Their commanding officer, however, had not learned the time of H hour, as the runner who was sent to him with the information did not reach his post of command. In consequence the tanks did not begin their advance on time and first made their appearance on the left flank of the 141st Infantry some 15 minutes after the 2d Battalion had started the assault. They seem to have given some little assistance to various detachments of the 2d Battalion as it came forward, but as there was no liaison between the infantry and the tanks, and as the latter seemed to have no concerted plan of action, their assistance was negligible. * * * Worst of all, * * * they twice fired into that detachment (3d Battalion Headquarters and group of B Company), killing and wounding quite a number of men. * * * All the tanks shortly there-

after left the field. * * * During the course of the following afternoon (October 8), with the consent of the commanding officer, 141st Infantry, the tanks were withdrawn entirely from action.

History, 36th Div.

The 141st Infantry had a hard time on October 8, but the 142d had a harder. To begin with, the company commanders did not receive their orders until about 5 a. m.—too late to allow them to digest the orders properly and transmit them to their companies. Consequently the advance was from 5 to 15 minutes late in starting, which largely nullified the effects of the artillery barrage.

History, 36th Div.

The 2d Battalion advancing northwest fought its way past Hill 160. After it had overcome the German resistance on the Hill 160 ridge, the principal obstacle to the battalion's advance was the cemetery at the northeastern corner of St. Etienne, which was a mass of machine-gun nests dug among and through the graves, and which had a field of fire of from 500 to 1,000 meters through an arc of 180 degrees from southwest to northeast. Parts of the battalion finally arrived on the St. Etienne–Semide road about 1 kilometer northeast of St. Etienne. Here it was joined by portions of the other battalions and a line was established which seems to have extended from the northeastern corner of St. Etienne, through the cemetery toward Semide. Here the troops dug in. The left of the line was secured at first by the French 7th Division,

Infor. Off. 7th Div. to G–3.

whose line at 10.20 a. m. was northwest of St. Etienne, and later on by the occupation of the town by American troops. But the right was absolutely uncovered, as a gap of more than 2 kilometers existed between the 142d and 141st Infantry Regiments, and, moreover, the latter's most advanced elements were more than a kilometer in

Op. Rpt., 4th Brig.

rear. This fact, and the disorganization of the troops, caused the withdrawal of the 142d Infantry during the late afternoon to the ridge through Hill 160. Communication with the French 7th Division was established through the American troops in and north of St. Etienne, but connection with the 141st Infantry was not obtained until the next day.

History, 36th Div.

The tanks attached to the 142d Infantry rendered no more service than those with the 141st Infantry. The tank commander was killed early in the morning while the infantry was attacking Hill 160, and one tank disabled. The others then withdrew.

St. Etienne itself does not seem to have caused much difficulty during the fighting on October 8. A platoon of Company I, 142d Infantry, is reported to have entered the town during the morning, established connection with the French, "who were found there in light force," and to have remained there the remainder of the day. A patrol of the 142d Infantry probably entered St. Etienne, but the town can not be said to have been in American possession until about 11 a. m., when the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, which was designated for liaison duty on the left of the 71st Brigade, entered the town without difficulty. Two of the companies of this battalion attempted to occupy trenches to the north of the town, but were unable to do so, whereupon they fell back on the other two companies and occupied trenches to the south, connecting with the 7th French Division. At 4.40 p. m. the American line included St. Etienne. The evening of October 8, a battalion of the 2d Engineers reinforced the Marine battalion.

History, 36th Div.

Op. Rpt., 36th Div.

Op. Rpt., 4th Brig.

Message, 3d Brig. to G–3.

Infor. Off 7th Div. to G–3.

Op. Rpt., 36th Div.

Op. Rpt., 2d Div.

The 71st Brigade had been roughly handled in its first active service. Its losses from all causes—killed, wounded, missing, and gassed—amounted to 75 officers and 1,314 enlisted men, a percentage of 33 for officers and 23 for enlisted. These losses were high, and appeared higher. Exaggeration of losses always occurs especially in new troops, and this action was no exception. At 8.45 a. m. a message from the 71st Brigade to G–3 states that the losses had been 50 per cent. This and other discouraging reports caused considerable apprehension as to the safety of the right flank of the 71st Brigade, and the brigade commander requested that the 72d Brigade and 131st Machine Gun Battalion be ordered to reinforce him. Gen. Lejeune repeated this request to the 21st Corps, at the same time telling Gen. Whitworth that he had ordered Gen. Ely to put in everything he had. In the meantime the 71st Brigade had stopped advancing, and as the Germans did not counter attack, reinforcements were unnecessary.

Appendix to History, 36th Div.

Message, 71st Brig. to C. of S.

Message, G–3 to Col. Lay, with 21st Corps.

Lejeune to Whitworth.

The failure of the 71st Brigade is not fully explained by its heavy losses. The chief of staff of the 36th Division states that the failure of the attack was largely due to the fact that the line of departure was given as the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road, whereas the true line was generally some distance in rear of that road; the artillery

Statement of C. of S. Feb., 1920.

barrage thus left untouched the advanced German machine-gun groups, which were able to oppose and disorganize the advance of the 71st Brigade from the very beginning of the attack.

The sketch referred to in the Artillery Annex to Field Order No. 40, 2d Division, shows that the barrage came down on a line between 300 and 400 meters north of the St. Etienne–Orfeuil road. The irregular front line of the 71st Brigade, while it followed the general line of this road, departed from it in places by several hundred meters, and was in advance of it only in the left of the sector. It is therefore certain that a strip several hundred meters wide in front of the 71st Brigade was untouched by the barrage and the events of the battle indicate that the Germans had machine guns in this area. Such a situation was not uncommon during the war, and was usually met by withdrawing the troops from the front line before an attack in order to allow the barrage to cover doubtful territory. Had this been done, the barrage could have been placed as far south of where it actually fell as desired. Why this was not done it is impossible to say, except that haste seems to have characterized this whole attack.

The front line of the 71st Brigade on the night of October 8–9 ran generally east and west from a point about 2 kilometers northwest of Médéah Farm to the western slope of Hill 160. In the sector of the 141st Infantry it was parallel to the St. Etienne–Orfeuil road and about 400 meters north of it. In that of the 142d Infantry it was bent to the north around Hill 160. The line was held by provisional organizations composed of such men as could be assembled. It was not continuous and the two infantry regiments were not in communication. The battalion of the 2d Engineers maintained communication with the 73d French Division on the right, and a battalion of the 6th Marines, reinforced by a battalion of the 2d Engineers, held St. Etienne and the cemetery and were in communication with the French 7th Division. The line was supported by the infantry of the 2d Division on Blanc Mont–Médéah Farm ridge.

Instructions, 2d Div. to 71st Brig., Oct. 9.

Instructions received by the commander of the 71st Brigade early on October 9 directed him to rectify his line and organize it in depth; to maintain contact with the enemy and adjacent divisions; to reconnoiter the trench system 800 meters north of St. Etienne and to

take it over if unoccupied and to prepare to attack it at 10 a. m. if occupied; to prepare to take over entire sector of 2d Division, which was to be withdrawn on the night of October 9–10.

The 71st Brigade, however, was in no condition to attack. It devoted the day to the reorganization of its troops, who were stretched across the divisional sector in a single line without either supports or reserves except those furnished by the 2d Division. There was no mixing of regiments, but within each regimental sector battalions, companies, and platoons had lost all signs of organization. Provisional units were formed, and were placed so as to fill up gaps in the line, rectify it, and secure communication with adjacent units.

History, 36th Div. Op. Rpt., 36th Div. Op. Rpt., 2d Div.

The line of the 142d Infantry had been erroneously reported as in rear of that of the 141st Infantry. In order to correct this a provisional battalion of the 142d Infantry, accompanied by a platoon of Stokes mortars and one of machine guns, attempted to advance toward St. Etienne about 11.30 a. m., but did not get far beyond the crest of the Hill 160 ridge. Here it took shelter and waited until night, when it returned to Hill 160. This was the only offensive operation during the day.

Op. Rpt., 36th Div. History, 36th Div.

There was no change in the position of the 71st Brigade's line on October 9. A battalion of the 2d Engineers still was connecting the 141st Infantry with the French 73d Division on the right. On the left, however, the battalion of the 6th Marines had occupied the trenches 700 meters north of St. Etienne. This left flank information group, composed of Marines and Engineers, was relieved the night of October 9–10 and on October 10 by detachments of the 142d Infantry taken from Hill 160. The front line of the 36th Division then included St. Etienne and the cemetery, two points that had given so much trouble to both French and Americans.

Message, Col. Strong to G–3. History, 36th Div.

The Fourth French Army "Order of the day," for October 9, stated that the fraction of the 36th Division north of Suippes (the part not already engaged) was placed at the disposal of the 21st Corps, and that it would relieve the 2d Division except artillery. On October 8 the commanding general, 21st Corps, directed the 36th Division to relieve the 2d Division the evening of October 9.

4th Army Staff, 3d Bureau, Oct. 8. S. O. 3.781/3, 21st Corps, Oct. 8.

F. O. 41, 2d Div. The relief was effected by Field Order No. 41, 2d Division, which prescribed that it should be completed before 5 a. m. October 10. The 2d Field Artillery Brigade, the 2d Engineers, and certain supply and sanitary units and matériel, were to remain with the 36th Division, and the machine guns in the front line and support positions were to remain for 24 hours. Command was to pass to the 36th Division at 10 a. m. October 10.

F. O. 5, 36th Div. The 36th Division (less artillery, field signal battalion, and 71st Brigade) at the time of receipt of General Order No. 41, 2d Division, was in the area Suippes–Souain. The 72d Brigade and the 131st Machine Gun Battalion were ordered to concentrate during the day of October 9 in the vicinity of Navarin Farm preparatory to effecting the relief. The signal battalion was already in this vicinity. Thence conducted by guides from the troops to be relieved, they proceeded at 9 p. m. to their respective areas.

F. O. 5, 36th Div. History, 36th Div. Op. Rpt., 3d Brig. The 143d Infantry relieved the 3d Brigade in its support and reserve positions. The 2d and 3d Battalions relieved the 23d Infantry about 2 kilometers southeast of St. Etienne, south of the St. Etienne–Orfeuil road and east of the St. Etienne–Somme-Py road. The 1st Battalion took position near the road crossing.

The 144th Infantry relieved the 4th Brigade. Its 1st Battalion relieved the 6th Mariñes southeast of St. Etienne and west of the St. Etienne–Somme-Py road. The 2d and 3d Battalions relieved the 5th Marines just north of Blanc Mont.

History, 36th Div. Both regiments stated that they were able to obtain but little information from the troops relieved.

History, 36th Div. Companies C and D, 133d Machine Gun Battalion, were attached to the 143d Infantry, and Companies A and B to the 144th Infantry.

Op. Rpt., 2d Div. The 72d Brigade headquarters were established about 1½ kilometers southwest of Somme-Py, at the former headquarters of the 4th Brigade.

History, 36th Div. The relief was completed by 2.30 a. m. October 10, except that the 131st Machine Gun Battalion did not get into position until late the same morning. Company B seems to have been held near headquarters of the 71st Brigade, while Company A was sent north of Médéah Farm as an information group on the right of the 141st Infantry.

Orders issued by the 21st French Corps for October 10 contemplated the cleaning up by the 36th Division of certain trenches 1,200 meters north of St. Etienne. This operation was to commence at 9.30 a. m. October 10, and when the orders for it were received at headquarters of the 71st Brigade the relief of the 2d Division had not been completed. Thus the order, if obeyed, would have necessitated an advance and probably an attack by the 71st Brigade, and its commanding general, believing his brigade not sufficiently recovered from its efforts of November 8, went to headquarters of the 2d Division and had the contemplated attack abandoned.

Op. Order 3798/3, for Oct. 10, 21st Corps.

History, 36th Div.

The command of the sector passed from the 2d to the 36th Division at 10 a. m. October 10, and the 36th Division headquarters was established at the former headquarters of the 2d Division at Somme-Py. The commanding general, 2d Division, and his assistant chief of staff, G–3, remained with the commanding general, 36th Division, for 24 hours longer.

Op. Rpt., 2d Div.

The 2d Division (less the units to remain with the 36th Division)[4] was assembled near Navarin Farm, whence it marched to the Suippes–Somme-Suippes area. The 3d Brigade marched to billets 4 kilometers northeast of Suippes and the 4th Brigade to the Suippes–Nantivet–Somme-Suippes area, where it passed to the reserve of the Fourth Army. The 2d Division machine-gun units were relieved from duty with the 36th Division on October 10 and rejoined their division.

Op. Rpt., 2d Div.

Op. Rpts., 3d and 4th Brigs.

The opinion held by the French on the operations of the 2d Division in Champagne is shown by the following extracts:

Information Bulletin, 4th Army, Oct. 7.

> Up to October 4, at which date the present bulletin is written, the Fourth Army has pushed its advance up to the objectives of the very highest importance. A splendid American division, full of dash and ardor, the 2d Division, U. S., placed at the disposition of the 21st Corps on October 3, made itself master of Massif du Blanc Mont, which dominates the valley of the Suippes in rear of the region of Monts; this conquest rapidly brought about the downfall of Notre Dame des Champs and the Grand Bois de St. Souplet.

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[4] The units of the 2d Division which remained with the 36th Division were the 2d F. A. Brigade, part of the 2d Ammunition Train, 2d Engineers, 30 trucks of 2d Supply Train, 19 water carts, and certain ordnance matériel.

History, 36th Div.

Intel. Rpt., 21st Corps, Oct. 6.

The Intelligence Report of the 21st Corps for October 6 states:

> Despite the flank fire of extremely numerous machine guns, artillery, and even minenwerfers, both on its right and left flanks, the 2d Division, U. S., was able to maintain in toto its advance, and thus made possible the advance of the 11th Corps on the morning of the 5th to the River Arnes.

Casualty list, 2d Div.; Appendix to Op. Rpt.

The severity of the fighting of the 2d Division is evidenced by the following casualty list, which includes the losses October 2–10, inclusive:

	Officers.	Enlisted.
Killed	41	685
Missing	6	579
Severely wounded	48	926
Slightly wounded	102	2,367
Gassed	12	207
Total	209	4,771

Appendix to Op. Rpt., 2d Div.

The division captured 1,963 prisoners, including 48 officers. It reports the capture of 25 guns, 332 machine guns, 20 trench mortars, 6 antitank guns, besides great quantities of ammunition, tools, lumber, signal property, railroad equipment, etc.

American weekly battle order map; French daily battle order map.

During its operations near Blanc Mont the 2d Division was opposed by the 200th and 213th German Divisions, both of which were reported to be fresh. In addition prisoners were reported to have been captured from six other divisions, but it is impossible to ascertain what portions of these divisions were put into the line. About this time the Germans commenced to reinforce weak places by bringing up whatever troops they could lay hands on, which evidently accounts for the large number of divisions seemingly opposed to the 2d Division from October 2 to 10.

Intel. Rpts., 21st Corps.

Early in the morning of October 10, unmistakable signs pointed to a withdrawal of the enemy along the entire front of the Fourth Army. In front of the 21st Corps enemy batteries were firing at long range, and batteries previously reported in the immediate vicinity had not fired for 12 hours. French patrols sent out from the 73d Division had lost touch with the enemy north of Médéah Farm. Later these patrols reported that they had gone 500 meters north of Bémont Château without gaining contact. The 7th French Division was reported to have advanced 3 kilometers north of St. Etienne, where it encountered fire from its right flank.

Message, S. R. O. T. 55 to 2d F. A. Brig.

Message, C. O. 121st Art. to G–3.

History, 36th Div.

The assistant chief of staff, 2d Division, informed the 71st Brigade that the enemy was evidently retreating and ordered energetic patrolling to verify this. During the afternoon indications of the enemy's retreat multiplied. The French divisions on the flanks of the 36th Division had passed the front of the 71st Brigade during the morning, but no general attack was ordered by that brigade, which merely maintained contact. In doing this the provisional units of the 141st Infantry made a slight advance of about 300 meters, which brought its front line to the unimproved road leading due east from St. Etienne, where they "dug in." This operation was in the nature of a reconnaissance in force. The 142d Infantry is reported to have sent out patrols which "met with such heavy enemy fire from the trenches north of St. Etienne * * * that no further advance was attempted, and throughout the remainder of the day the regiment remained in its position."

Information of enemy in History, 36th Div., pp. 191–192.

History, 36th Div.

History, 36th Div.

On October 10, the 141st Infantry reported casualties of 6 killed and 12 wounded, and the 142d Infantry, 2 killed and 58 wounded.

History, 36th Div., p. 217.

Orders from the 21st Corps, received by the 36th Division shortly before noon on October 10, gave information of the enemy's withdrawal and of the advance of the 73d and 124th French Divisions (the center and right divisions of the 21st Corps), and directed the 36th Division to advance its lines and keep abreast of the 11th Corps.

In compliance with the corps order, the 36th Division issued Field Order No. 6, which directed the advance of the 36th Division to a line even with the French divisions on its flanks. The attack was to be made at 5 p. m. October 10 by the 72d Brigade, regiments abreast, which was to pass through the 71st Brigade, 143d Infantry on the right and 144th Infantry on the left, each regiment in column of battalions. After the passage of the lines the 71st Brigade and the 2d Engineers were to constitute the reserve.

F. O. 6, 36th Div.

Arrangements for artillery support were made verbally with the commanding officer, 2d Field Artillery Brigade, whose regiments, in view of uncertainty as to the location of both the French and the 71st Brigade, were ordered to communicate directly with the infantry and to give them the necessary support.

History, 36th Div.

The above order (Field Order No. 6) was distributed and discussed at division headquarters at about 2 p. m. October 10, the commanding general, 72d Brigade, and his regimental and machine gun battalion commanders being present.

The orders of the commanding general, 72d Brigade, are probably embodied in Field Order No. 1, 72d Brigade, no copy of which can be located.

History, 36th Div. The attack order of the commanding officer, 143d Infantry, assigned the 2d Battalion as the assaulting battalion, Companies L and M to the support and the 1st Battalion to the reserve. Companies I and K, and Company D, 133d Machine Gun Battalion, formed the right information group and a platoon of Company G plus two machine guns the left detachment. The 144th Infantry was expected to furnish like troops to the interregimental information group.

History, 36th Div. The advance started about 6 p. m., delayed, it appears, by artillery fire during the preparatory arrangements and by the distances separating the troops. But little progress was made. The 2d and 3d Battalions soon became intermingled with the 141st Infantry and their most advanced elements got only as far as the St. Etienne–Scay Farm road, where they dug in, thus prolonging to the west the front line of the 141st Infantry, which had reached that road during its reconnaissance in force. The 1st Battalion, in reserve, did not move. Neither the Regimental Machine Gun Company nor Company D, 133d Machine Gun Battalion, participated in the attack. Casualties in the 143d Infantry consisted of 8 killed and 83 wounded.

The 1st Battalion, 144th Infantry, which was on the southwest slope of Hill 160, had during the afternoon of October 10, been ordered to relieve the troops of the 142d Infantry in St. Etienne, and Company B was engaged in this operation when the battalion commander received an order placing his battalion in reserve for an attack, to be delivered at 5 p. m. Company B was withdrawn and the battalion resumed its original position.

The attack order of the commanding officer, 144th Infantry, designated the 2d Battalion plus the Regimental Machine Gun Company, the 37 millimeter guns and Stokes mortars as the assaulting battalion, the 3d as the support and the 1st as reserve. No instructions for

connection with adjacent troops or for flank protection were given.

The 144th Infantry also advanced at about 6 p. m. It made no better progress than the 143d Infantry. The leading battalion seems to have reached a system of old German trenches southeast of St. Etienne from which position it was moved to the right in rear (south) of Hill 160. The support battalion (3d) conformed to the movements of the 2d, and morning found both battalions well within the lines of the 142d Infantry. The reserve battalion (1st) did not move from its position on Blanc Mont.

Casualties in the 144th Infantry were 31 wounded.

Field Order No. 6, 36th Division, directed the 72d Brigade to pass through the lines of the 71st Brigade. There was no passage of lines, and on the morning of October 11 the 71st Brigade was still holding the front line of the division sector, and the 72d Brigade was in its rear, except for detachments of the 143d Infantry, who were along the Scay Farm–St. Etienne road between the 141st and 142d regiments.

At 5 p. m. October 10 the 21st Corps issued Operation Order No. 3.806/3, which gave the information that the enemy was withdrawing along the entire corps front and directed an energetic pursuit toward Attigny. The 36th Division was directed to conform to the movements of the 73d Division, which was reported to have advanced to the north edge of the woods north of Bémont Château. Op. Order 3.806/3, 21st Corps.

The above order was received at division headquarters some time during the evening of October 10, and upon it was based Field Order No. 7, which was issued at 11.30 p. m., and was almost identical with Field Order No. 6, except that it assigned objectives. H hour was 9.30 a. m., October 11. F. O. 7, 36th Div.

In compliance with Field Order No. 7, the 72d Brigade advanced the morning of October 11 from its position of the night before. The 144th Infantry (whose 1st Battalion had relieved the mixed troops of the 142d Infantry in St. Etienne early on October 11) seems to have started on time, but the 143d Infantry did not start until some time after H hour, thus leaving uncovered the left flank of the 73d French Division and the right flank of the 144th Infantry. However, there was practically no op- History, 36th Div.

position on either the French or American front and the attack ordered by Field Order No. 7 became an easy but very slow pursuit. Upon arriving at the second objective named in Field Order No. 7, line Machault–Semide, the troops halted and bivouacked for the night. The 144th Infantry had lost 3 killed and 26 wounded during the day and the 143d Infantry 1 killed and 70 "wounded or gassed."

The front line of the 36th Division had been advanced 4 kilometers. Why the 72d Brigade halted on the second objective does not appear, but it may be because the French divisions on its flanks halted also, although somewhat in advance of the 36th Division.

The 71st Brigade did not move on October 11, but devoted the day to reorganizing and supplying its still intermingled troops.

Op. Order, 21st Corps, 3.819/3.

Corps orders for October 12 directed the resumption of the pursuit, the day's objective being the heights Chardeny-Vaux. The 36th Division objective included Vaux and Hill 167 to the northwest thereof.

F. O. 8, 36th Div.

The 36th Division orders directed the 72d Brigade to continue the pursuit, with the 71st Brigade and 131st Machine Gun Battalion following in reserve at 4 kilometers. H hour was 6 a. m.

F. O. 2, 72d Brig.

Field Order No. 2, 72d Brigade, directed the brigade to advance with its units in the same relative position in which they had halted for the night, and emphasized connection with the adjoining French divisions which were in advance of the 72d Brigade.

Pursuant to the above orders, the advance was resumed at 6 a. m. October 12 by the 144th Infantry. The 143d Infantry, not having received its orders, was slow in starting, but took up the march, as the commanding officer of the leading battalion understood that he was to advance the morning of the 12th, in connection with adjacent troops. Little opposition was encountered, the casualties for the day in the brigade being 9 killed and 58 wounded. The brigade halted late in the afternoon and established outposts just north of Hill 167. Communication with the adjacent French divisions, the 73d and 7th, was maintained during the advance. Both of these divisions, in compliance with a corps order issued at 1.30 a. m. October 12, passed beyond the day's objective and reached the canal which parallels the Aisne River on its south bank.

Order, 21st Corps, 3.827/3.

The 71st Brigade bivouacked the night of October 11–12 1½ kilometers southeast of Dricourt. Op. Rpt., 36th Div.

The corps operation order for October 13 directed that the south bank of the Aisne be cleared of the enemy and that arrangements be made to cross the river. During the night October 13–14 the 124th French Division was to be relieved, the 73d Division was to take over its front, and the 36th Division was to extend its line to the right to take over the sector of the 73d Division to include the Briqueterie, 1,000 meters east of Attigny. Op. Order, 21st Corps, 3831/3.

The 72d Brigade was given the task of reconnoitering to the river, clearing the south shore, and in case the north bank was not strongly held, of establishing bridgeheads. The 71st Brigade was to make arrangements to take over the left of the 73d Division's sector. F. O. 9, 36th Div.

Complying with Field Order 9, the 1st Battalion, 143d Infantry, advanced to the canal during the late morning of October 13, its right resting on Attigny. The 1st Battalion, 144th Infantry, also advanced to the canal and dug in, its left resting on Givry. The 3d Battalion followed the 1st and was also near Givry.[5] The remainder of the brigade was distributed in depth between the canal and the line of resistance, which was on the heights south of Attigny. History, 36th Div. Op. Rpt., 36th Div.

The above-described movements drew fire from the north bank of the Aisne and the brigade's casualties for the day were 29 killed and 207 wounded, most of them being in the 144th Infantry. This and other signs indicated that the Germans intended to make a stand on the Aisne.

During the night of October 13–14 the 71st Brigade took over the front of the 124th French Division to include the Briqueterie, and the troops in the divisional sector were rearranged so that the infantry brigades were side by side, 71st on the right and the 72d on the left. From right to left the regiments held the line as follows: 141st, 142d, 143d, 144th. The sector from front to rear was divided into three zones—outpost, support, and reserve zones. Each regiment had a battalion in the outpost zone (which extended from the river to the line of resistance on Hill 167), and a battalion and a machine-gun company in regimental reserve. Each brigade had a F. O. 10, 36th Div. History, 36th Div.

[5] The History of the 36th Division states that the advance of the 144th Infantry to the canal was without authority from either brigade or division commander.

battalion and a machine-gun company in brigade reserve and the division reserve consisted of a battalion and a machine-gun company from each brigade and the 131st Machine Gun Battalion. The ground between the river and the heights was held lightly, the bulk of the troops being held in rear of the line of resistance. The division reserve was located near Dricourt.

A light regiment of the 2d Field Artillery Brigade supported each brigade and the heavy regiment the entire divisional sector.

The divisional front line after the above dispositions were completed extended from the Briqueterie, inclusive (1 kilometer east of Attigny), to Givry, inclusive.

The rearrangement of the troops of the 36th Division was completed by daylight October 14, except that considerable confusion existed in the 144th Infantry, whose 1st and 3d Battalions were near Givry, and this regiment was not in its proper position until the night of October 15–16.

The period from October 14 to October 26 was one of comparative inactivity in the sector of the 36th Division and resembled the former trench warfare. The division took advantage of the suspension of operations to re-equip its troops, police the battle fields near St. Etienne, and bury its dead. Patrolling went on constantly and exposure always drew fire from the north bank of the Aisne. Possible crossing places were reconnoitered and preparations were made to cross the river when the advance should be resumed.

History, 36th Div.
F. O. 11, 36th Div.

Effective noon October 18, the headquarters and corps troops of the 21st Corps were withdrawn from the Fourth Army for operations elsewhere. The 36th Division became the right division of the 11th Corps, and the 73d French Division became the left division of the 9th Corps. These reassignments made no change in the front occupied by the 36th Division except to shift the eastern boundary slightly to the east.

Messages, 8 and 9, G–3, 36th Div., Oct. 18.
History, 36th Div.
Op. Rpt., 36th Div.

On the night October 20–21 the 7th French Division was withdrawn from the line and its sector was taken over by the 61st French and 36th American Divisions. To accomplish this both of the brigades of the 36th Division extended their areas to the west, the 71st Brigade taking over a portion of the area of the 72d Brigade and the latter taking over a portion of the area of the 7th French Division. After the change was made, the west-

ern boundary of the 36th Division ran approximately north and south just east of the villages of Ambly-Haut and Fleury.

The 36th Division was again shifted the night of October 22–23. The 73d French Division was withdrawn from the line, the 36th Division took over its area, and the 61st French Division took over the front of the 36th Division to Givry, exclusive. This change practically reestablished the former western boundary of the 36th Division. The eastern boundary, after the shift, was Voncq (exclusive)–Coegny–Chardeny–Quilly (all inclusive). In making the change the regiments were also shifted in line and occupied the sector in the following order from right to left: 142d, 141st, 144th, 143d. The 53d French Division was on the right of the 36th.

F. O. 12, 36th Div.
History, 36th Div.
Op. Rpt., 36th Div.

This last shift to the east brought the 71st Brigade opposite a horseshoe bend in the Aisne, 3 kilometers east of Attigny. This bend was formed by a swing of the river to the north and was 3 kilometers broad at the base and about the same distance in depth. The ground within the loop was higher than the country to the south, and itself was dominated by the hills to the north and east of the river. The Germans, in their withdrawal across the river, had not relinquished the ground within this loop, but had constructed a trench across its base which was protected by several belts of wire and by strong points. The French 73d Division attacked this position unsuccessfully on October 16 and 17; it was known as the Forest Farm position by reason of a farm situated near the base of the loop. On October 23 the 36th Division was directed to prepare a plan for the reduction of this position, and on October 24 orders from the 11th Corps directed the division to take the position before February 27, and assigned additional artillery for that purpose.

Op. Rpt., 36th Div.
Op. Order 59, 11th Corps.

On the same day, October 24, a corps order directed the relief of the 36th Division by the 61st and 22d French Divisions the nights of October 26–27 and 27–28. When it was decided to attack the Forest Farm position on October 27, the relief of the attacking units, two battalions, was postponed until the night October 28–29, while the 2d Field Artillery Brigade's relief was postponed until the night October 27–28.

Op. Order 60, 11th Corps.
Op. Order 61, 11th Corps.

F. O. 13, 36th Div.

The actual relief was accomplished as follows:

History, 36th Div.

The night of October 26–27 the 143d Infantry was relieved by the 61st French Division and marched to the vicinity of St. Marie-à-Py. The same division relieved the 144th Infantry the night of October 27–28, and the regiment marched to Machault. The reserve battalions of the 71st Brigade, the 1st of the 142d Infantry and the 3d of the 141st, were relieved by the 22d French Division the same night and marched to Somme-Py.

The support battalions of the 71st Brigade, the 1st of the 141st Infantry and the 2d of the 142d Infantry, each having two platoons of the 132d Machine Gun Battalion, were relieved the night of October 28–29 by the 22d French Division and marched to the Somme-Py area.

The relief of the reserve and support battalions of the 71st Brigade was not effected until after the success of the attack upon Forest Farm had been assured.

F. O. 14, 36th Div.

The capture of the Forest Farm position was assigned to the 71st Brigade, supported by the 2d Field Artillery Brigade and the artillery of the 9th and 11th Corps and the 61st and 53d Divisions.

11th A. C. Hdqs., Art. No. 2025.

It is not clear just what French artillery actually participated in this operation. The orders drawn up by the commander of the artillery of the 11th Corps, who had been loaned to the 36th Division to coordinate the action of the French artillery, specify the duties to be performed by the artillery of the 9th Corps, the heavy artillery of "the Army Corps" (the 11th) and by the artillery of the 61st Division. H hour was at 4.30 p. m. October 27. The artillery preparation commenced 20 minutes earlier and was directed on the German positions within the bend in the river, and upon the batteries located north of the river within the sector Semuy–Givry. Its effectiveness was such that the infantry advanced to the objective with almost no casualties.

F. O. 6, 71st Brig.

History, 36th Div.

The infantry attack was made by the two regiments of the 71st Brigade abreast, the 142d on the right and the 141st on the left. Each regiment had a company of the 132d Machine Gun Battalion attached, and was formed in three lines with a battalion as attacking unit, one in support, and one in reserve. The attacking battalions, 3d of the 142d Infantry and 2d of the 141st Infantry, each had attached a platoon of machine guns and in addition Company D, 141st Infantry, was attached to the assaulting battalion of its regiment.

The parallel of departure followed the road from the Briqueterie to Roche. The line held by the 71st Brigade was generally in advance of this road, and was withdrawn thereto the night of October 26–27. Promptly at H hour on October 27, the infantry advanced, following the barrage which drove the Germans to their dugouts and kept them there until they surrendered. Within an hour the troops were on the objective, a line running southeast through Forest Farm, with a loss of but 11 killed and 36 wounded. One hundred and ninety-four prisoners were captured. Op. Rpt., 36th Div.

The support battalions, 1st of the 141st Infantry and 2d of the 142d, were used as information groups and to clean up in rear of the attacking battalions. The reserve battalions did not participate in the fight at all.

The command of the 36th Division sector passed to the 22d French Division at 8 a. m. October 28. At this time all of the organizations of the 36th Division had been relieved except the troops occupying the captured Forest Farm position and the two battalions supporting them. The latter were relieved the night of October 28–29. The former remained in position until between 3 and 5 a. m. October 29, when they were relieved by the 22d French Division and proceeded, some by truck and some by marching, to the camps near Somme-Suippes, where the remainder of the division had preceded them. The 2d Field Artillery Brigade and the 2d Engineers rejoined their division in the Argonne. Op. Order 60, 11th A. C.

The contrast between the first and last operations of the 36th Division is great. The former were characterized by orders hastily given and transmitted, imperfectly understood, and consequently poorly executed. The latter operation was carefully planned and the orders were so given as to allow them to reach and be understood by the troops who were to execute them. The result was almost a bloodless victory. To be sure the troops had been seasoned by over two weeks' experience in what approximated to sector warfare, but that alone would not account for the difference. Had the attack of October 8 been as thoroughly planned and prepared as that of October 27 it would have stood a chance of success even with inexperienced troops, remembering that the Germans were in retreat when the 36th Division entered the line.

American weekly battle order maps; French daily battle order maps.

During its operations, October 6–28, the 36th Division was opposed by the 17th and 213th German Divisions, the former reported as "tired" and the latter as "fresh." Besides the above, reports indicate that parts, at least, of the 195th, 242d, and 239th Divisions were in line, but it is impossible to verify this. They were probably there, as the Germans were then throwing into line whatever troops they could lay their hands on.

History, 36th Div.

The casualties of the 36th Division while in line October 6–28 were as follows:

	Officers.	Enlisted.
Killed	23	486
Wounded	64	1,450
Missing		80
Gassed	35	427
Total	122	2,443

S. O. 458/3, 3d Bureau, 4th Army.

On October 28 the 36th Division was transferred to the First American Army and ordered to proceed to the Dampierre-le-Chateau area, there to await orders. The movement was made by marching on October 30 and 31.

F. O. 95, 1st Army.

There the division passed into the reserve of the First Army and was attached to the 1st Corps.

ORGANIZATION OF DIVISIONS (OCTOBER. 1918).

2D DIVISION.

Commanding general:
Maj. Gen. J. A. Lejeune, U. S. M. C.
Chief of staff:
Col. J. C. Rhea, G. S.
G–1:
Lieut. Col. Hugh Matthews.
G–2:
Maj. R. S. Keyser.
G–3:
Col. H. B. Myers.
3d Infantry Brigade:
Brig. Gen. H. E. Ely.
9th Infantry:
Col. G. W. Stuart.
23d Infantry:
Col. E. R. Stone.
5th Machine Gun Battalion:
Maj. H. T. Lewis.
4th Infantry Brigade:
Brig. Gen. W. C. Neville.
5th Marines:
Col. Logan Feland.
6th Marines:
Col. Harry Lee.
6th Machine Gun Battalion:
Maj. L. W. T. Waller, jr.
2d Field Artillery Brigade:
Brig. Gen. A. J. Bowley.
12th Field Artillery:
Lieut. Col. J. A. Holabird.
15th Field Artillery:
Col. J. R. Davis.
17th Field Artillery:
Lieut. Col. L. C. Sparks.
4th (Divisional) Machine Gun Battalion:
Maj. A. D. Bruce.
1st Field Signal Battalion:
Maj. Charles Murphy.
2d Engineers:
Col. W. A. Mitchell.

36TH DIVISION.

Commanding general:
Maj. Gen. W. R. Smith.
Chief of staff:
Col. E. J. Williams, G. S.
G–1:
Col. W. G. Sills (Oct. 12–25).
Lieut. Col. C. W. Neal, F. A.
G–2:
Lieut. Col. C. H. Mason, G. S.
G–3:
Lieut. Col. J. A. Atkins, G. S.
71st Infantry Brigade:
Brig. Gen. Pegram Whitworth.
141st Infantry:
Col. W. E. Jackson.
Lieut. Col. L. R. James (commanding after Oct. 19).
142d Infantry:
Col. A. W. Bloor.
132d Machine Gun Battalion:
Maj. P. A. Weatherred (commanding until Oct. 21).
Capt. S. D. Redings (commanding after Oct. 21).
72d Infantry Brigade:
Brig. Gen. J. A. Hulen.
143d Infantry:
Col. J. S. Hoover (commanding until Oct. 18).
Lieut. Col. I. J. Phillipson (commanding after Oct. 18).
144th Infantry:
Col. J. S. Parker (commanding until Oct. 14).
Lieut. Col. O. E. Roberts (commanding after Oct. 14).
133d Machine Gun Battalion:
Maj. L. S. Davidson.
131st (Divisional) Machine Gun Battalion:
Maj. Ellis Stephenson.
111th Field Signal Battalion:
Maj. G. A. Robinson.

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2. Operation Report, 2d Division, period Sept. 15 to Oct. 9, 1918.
   Field Orders, 2d Division, 1918.
   Operation Report, 3d Infantry Brigade.
   Operation Report, 4th Infantry Brigade.
   File of messages, Headquarters 2d Division, Oct. 2 to Oct. 9, 1918.
   History of 23d Infantry.
   Field Orders, 3d Infantry Brigade, 1918.
   (Filed in Historical Branch, W. P. D., G. S.)
3. Field Orders, 36th Division.
   History of the 36th Division and Appendices.
   Operation Report, 36th Division.
   Field Orders, 71st Infantry Brigade.
   Field Orders, 72d Infantry Brigade.
   (Filed in Historical Branch, W. P. D., G. S.)
4. French Documents:
   Group of Armies of the Center.
   Fourth Army.
   Twenty-first Corps.
   Eleventh Corps.
   (Filed in Historical Branch, W. P. D., G. S.)
5. American and French Battle Order Maps.
   (Filed in G–2 records, A. E. F., Washington.)

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
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

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